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4Foreword
This report was prepared within the framework of the research 
project of the Institute of Policy Studies, funded by the Human 
Rights and Governance Grants Program (HRGGP) of the Open 
Society Institute. The nationwide survey of the Georgian popula-
tion aimed to assess public attitudes and the level of satisfaction 
of the population in relation to public goods and governmental 
policies - concerning issues on poverty and economy, social 
protection, health, education and corruption, public participation, 
human rights, media freedom, and infrastructure development. It 
assessed public perceptions and expectations with regards to these 
issues, the degree of popular participation in dealing with the most 
important problems of Georgian society, the level of trust toward 
different social institutions and the popularity of authority figures. 
It also examined public attitudes towards democracy, the politi-
cal situation and the external orientation of the country as well as 
examining the value system and preferences of the population.
The last surveys were carried out by IPS in 00 and 003 and 
this report tries to assess changes in public attitudes that have oc-
curred since then. This time has been marked by drastic changes 
in the political landscape of the country. In November 003, a 
peaceful revolt against Parliamentary election fraud occurred. 
Commonly called the ‘Rose Revolution’, this brought a young 
generation of politicians to power. Following this shift their have 
been many other changes. Georgia is coming closer to NATO 
membership and making more forceful steps towards European 
integration. As its relations with the West have improved, marked 
by the visit of President Bush last year, its relations with Russian 
have deteriorated . Russia is finally closing its Georgian military 
bases. Inside the country change has also been rapid. The Autono-
mous Republic of Ajara has been fully integrated into the country, 
infrastructure is being rehabilitated and reforms are occurring at 
society. For example, in education National Exams have been 
5introduced and steps have been taken towards reforming the 
university education. At the same time concerns persist. Unrest in 
prisons has been blamed on the Government and the ministry of 
the interior has been involved in considerable scandal, including 
the killing of banker Sandro Girgvliani. 
Many people contributed to preparation of the questionnaire, the 
interview of respondents, and processing, editing and publish-
ing of the results. We would like to acknowledge the particularly 
valuable contribution of Co-Director of the Institute for Policy 
Studies, George Tarkhan-Mouravi for the conceptualisation and 
design of the study. Great support was provided by IPS senior 
researchers Ana Kitiashvili and Ekaterine Pirtskhalava, to whom 
we extend our sincere gratitude. We also would like to express our 
gratitude to our interviewers, too numerous be listed here, for their 
hard work and dedication. Our thanks extend to Tinatin Eristavi 
for her excellent job in entering complicated statistical data and to 
Dr George Welton, Gio Sumbadze, Vasil Targamadze and Gogi 
Tarkhan-Mouravi for their valuable assistance in editing, desktop 
design, technical preparation and printing of this report. 
While this report reflects these many contributions, the author 
takes full responsibility for all its possible drawbacks. We fully 
acknowledge that many issues dealt with in this survey require 
more study to achieve deeper understanding of underlying factors. 
We also realize that presenting the statistical data in detail com-
plicates the perception of overall results, but did so to enable any 
interested parties to subject the results to deeper analysis. 
IPS is happy to take into consideration any suggestions and ideas 
that could help to improve the quality and the scope of the next 
survey, which is planned to be carried out in spring 007.  The 
report can also be found on institute’s website.
6Major findings
The survey was carried out from 5 to 8 June 006 in all nine 
regions of Georgia, Achara and the capital Tbilisi. It included both 
urban and rural areas. The questionnaire consisted of  0 ques-
tions. Interviewers visited respondents at home to take face to 
face interview. Respondents were selected to represent Georgia’s 
population in terms of gender and age. 
Among the surveyed 46.8% were located in urban and 53.% in 
rural areas.  53.6% were females and 46.4% were males. 3.9% 
were 7-4 years old, .9% were 5-34, 3.4% were 35-44, 
.% were 45-54, 3.8% were 55-64 and 5.8% were older than 
66. 64.3% of respondents were married, 4.0% were never mar-
ried, 7.7% were widowed and 4.0% divorced. The size of the 
households varied from  to  members, most often households 
comprised of four members. 3.6% of respondents reported family 
member working abroad. 38.8% had some kind of regular work.
Democracy  building  
5.7% of those surveyed did not consider Georgia democratic 
(Only 4.7% do consider Georgia democratic and 3.5% did not 
answer). This is higher than 003 (46.6%), but less than 00 
(56.4%).
Participation in decision making is one of the main features of 
liberal democracy. 63.8% consider participation as a necessary 
precondition for solving the acute problems facing the country. 
This compares to 53.8% in 00 and 56.6% in 003. A feeling of 
helplessness prevails among those surveyed. 77.0% think that a 
lay person cannot exert any influence on decisions (77.6% in 2002 
and 7.% in 003). Closely linked to participation is the belief 
that people in power consider opinion of its citizens. 64.7% of 
citizens think that they do not. 
Equality under the law, is not observed in Georgia according to 
70.9% of the population. 7.0% thinks that people are equal and 
7.% has no opinion.
Trust in state institutions is rather low, none of them enjoys the 
trust of at least half the population. The biggest share (47.3%) 
trusts the President and Ombudsman (43.7%), the smallest share 
(7.8%) trusts  the government and courts (8.8%).
We grouped the respondents from our survey according to who 
they said they would vote for in case of Parliamentary elections 
held  today.
.Supporters of National Movement  (NMS) 9.4%
.Supporters of all opposition parties  (OPS)  39.6%
3.Undecided      (U)  3.0%
No significant age or gender difference was found between the 
supporters of different parties.  
National Movement supporters  more positively evaluate the 
change of economic condition of their households over the last 
year (5.0%) than supporters of Opposition Parties  (4.9%) or 
Undecided  (5.0%). NMS are less critical of almost any  ac-
tions  undertaken by authorities, reveal  more optimism  than other 
groups. They differ much more from OPS and U than these two  
groups between each other.
Television undoubtedly remains the primary source for informa-
tion. 94.0% get their  information mainly from television, 55.4% 
from printed media, 8.3% from radio and 6.7% from internet. To 
53.6% friends and kin provide information and 9.6% get infor-
mation from family members.
Channel Imedi’s information programs have the biggest audi-
ence. They are watched by 87.0% of population and trusted also 
by the biggest part - 80.7%.  Rustavi 2’s information programs are 
watched by a slightly smaller number (76.9%), but are trusted by 
far fewer people (59.9%). Public television is watched by 3.5% 
and is trusted by .9%.  
8Imedi also leads the list of the most popular for political pro-
grams. At the top of the list are its two programs –Reactia( Reac-
tion) is watched by 7.%  and Pirvelebi (The Firsts) is watched 
by 64.5%. Imedi is also perceived as independent by a much 
greater portion of respondents (75.0%) than Rustavi 2 (56.9%).
Among journals the most popular is Sarke. 33.5% reported read-
ing it in the week preceding the survey. Among weeklies Kviris 
Palitra with 8.% and among dailies Akhali Taoba with 6.% 
are the most popular.
Generations differ in their preferred sources of information. 35-55 
years olds read more newspapers (Rezonance, Kviris palitra and 
Kronika), while young generation reads more the journals (Sarke, 
Gza,Tbiliseli, Tskheli Shokoladi and Anabechdi).
Governance
Five the most chosen by population problems that country faces 
were: The social insecurity of population and poverty (8.6%). 
relations with Russia (68.%), economic crises (60.8%), unre-
solved conflicts in Abkhazia and Ossetia (60.1%) and population 
decrease (37.3%).
Repairing roads (8.0%), building the army (80.3%), the stabili-
zation of power supply (75.4%),  withdrawal of Russian military 
bases (7.%), improvement of international image of Georgia 
(54.6%) were considered the biggest successes of the government, 
while overcoming poverty (63.5%), improvement of the economy 
(50.3%), conflicts in Abkhazia and Ossetia (44.4%), improve-
ment of healthcare services (40.7%) and defense of Human Rights 
(40.4%) remained as the biggest failures.
Over the next five years the population feared most  an increase of 
poverty (73.7%), increase of illnesses (69.5%), loss of Georgian 
9traditions (6.8%). The comparison with previous surveys dem-
onstrates that overall the population is more optimistic in 006 
than in either 00 or 003. This can be seen in most issues. The 
increase in optimism is the most substantial regarding corruption 
and the readiness of population to revolt against authorities. But 
the increase in threat of poverty is alarming and, compared to 
003, there is an increase in the perception that the country will 
lose a substantial part of its traditions. 
The decrease in corruption is certainly one of the main successes 
of the government. Very few provide interviewees cite examples 
of solicitation or payment of bribes. Only .0% indicated such 
examples in health care and .0% in educational institutions.
According to 34.4% the future of the country is mostly dependent 
on its own actions. According to 3.4% it s dependent  upon other 
countries, particularly Russia and USA. According to 8.6% it de-
pends on both. 5.6% could not answer the question. The share of 
those who believe that Georgia forges its own fate has decreased 
since in 003  44.9% and in 003 53.5% thought so.
Central to the country’s politics remains the choice between a 
Western orientation that looks towards Europe and US or an 
orientation towards Russia. Choice in orientation is significantly 
affected by events and Russian policy towards Georgia. After de-
taining Russian army officers on charges of espionage in October 
006 (4 months after the survey), and following the xenophobic 
behavior of Russians towards Georgians in Russia, we may expect 
that attitudes have changed. Nevertheless, in June when asked 
to choose the orientation of Georgia, the majority (59.0%) chose 
Russia over USA (4.0%) Such preference, although is not big, 
has proven to be stable. In 00 Russia was chosen by 56.% and 
in 003 by 5.9% of population.
The desire for NATO and EU membership is high and stable, 
showing a slight increase over time.  6.8% favors NATO mem-
bership (6.0%  in 00 and  in and 56.4% in 003), 6.6% are 
0
against it and 0.6% has no opinion.  Even greater is the support 
of population for the country aspiration to EU membership. 74.0% 
is for membership, 9.0% is against and 7.0% has no opinion. The 
share of supporters increased over time. In 00 69.5%  and in 
003 7.% were for membership.
Poverty
33.7% considers their family to be poor, 64.9% of medium afflu-
ence and only .4% as well-off. 45.4% pointed at the worsening 
economic conditions of their household compared to 3 years ago, 
s bit less, 40.4% estimated that their situation was worse than one 
year ago. 
On average expenditures per household member amounted to 
8.9 GEL, most often named sum being 50 GEL while necessary 
monthly income was estimated on average as 330. GEL, most 
often named was 00 GEL. 
Only 4.9% reported having monthly income and 4.6% occa-
sional income.
Poverty had an adverse effect on the health of respondents. 5.6% 
pointed to at least one instance in 006 when they were ill but did 
not visit doctor. Among them, the main reason for not visiting the 
doctor (78.8%) was financial. 
The self identification of a household as ‘poor’ is connected to 
the monthly expenditures in that household per person. However, 
income is not the sole factor. In total 90.% of “poor” and 78.6% 
of “non-poor” households spent less than 00 GEL per person. 
Affluence is correlated with the share of employed household 
members, with the number of sources of income as well as the 
type of income sources.  “Poor” people are more reliant on irregu-
lar income than “non-poor”, while more “non-poor“ name salaries 
and stipend as income source.
“Poor” households have much less possessions than “non-poor”. 
This difference is especially apparent in ownership of mobile 
phones, water heater, video player and car.

City dwellers not only spend much more per person per month 
than rural population (07.6 GEL against 59.0 GEL), but consider 
that far more money is necessary to have a decent life. (493. 
GEL compared to 86.8 GEL per member of the household). 
The rural population  more negatively estimate the changes of 
economic conditions of their households. A bigger share of them 
(43.6% compared to 36.7% of urbanites) identify a deterioration 
of the situation since last year and express less optimism relating 
to likely improvements in next year (39.% compared to 47.0% 
of urbanits). A bigger share of urban (48.0%) than rural (36.3%) 
respondents have an income.
Country events
There have been three Presidents of Georgia since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Saakashvili is the most popular among the three 
(5.0%), with Gamsakhurdia second (3.9%) and Shevardnadze 
third (8.8%).
9th April,  1989,  the conflict in Abkazia, the declaration of In-
dependence, the “Rose Revolution” and the 99-99 civil war 
were selected from the list of 16 events as five most important in 
the last two decades.
Attitudes and values
Feeling of having control over own life is  decreasing. 68.9% in 
00, 78.6% in 003 and only 56.5% in 006 were convinced that 
what person achieves in life mainly depends on individual. 
Low is the satisfaction  with different elements of their lives. Out 
of the eight different ‘aspects’ more than half of those surveyed 
expressed satisfaction with two elements,  with their family rela-
tionships (75.6%) and living location  (54.%). Respondents were 
least satisfied with their family income (75.2%).
Dissatisfaction prevails in the estimation of one’s own achieve-
ments. 49.3% do not think that  they have found their place in life 
(4.9% in 00 and  36.% in 003). 

Notwithstanding a low level of satisfaction  the population ex-
presses optimism about the future and this has grown since 003. 
88.5% looks towards the future with hope (85.6% in 003, not 
asked in 00) and 55.4% thinks that things will go their way 
(53.4% in 00 and  5.6% in 003).
Satisfaction with life is strongly connected to justice and self-de-
termination. Unfortunately only one-third of the surveyed (3.4%) 
believe that their advancement will be the result of hard-work. 
However, belief in meritocratic advancement has improved. In 
00/3 very slightly less than a quarter believed that hard work 
was the main basis for advancement.
Knowledge of foreign language (7.7%), computer skills (66.4%) 
and useful ties (44.6%) were selected as the most important skills 
needed for advancement. 
The population, therefore, remains discontented with economic 
conditions, violation of human rights and continues to feel that 
their opinions are not taken into consideration. In addition there  is 
a clear social division between supporters of the National Move-
ment and the rest of the public. On the other hand, the survey 
proved the continuing popularity of the President of Georgia and 
acknowledged achievements of authorities in fighting corruption, 
infrastructure development and army building. 
The population does not show high satisfaction with life in gen-
eral. The number who think that Georgia is on the rights path 
has increased over the years but is still low and slightly exceeds 
one third of population. About one third thinks it impossible to 
reach normal living standards by the honest work alone, showing 
a  slight decrease since 003. Only a quarter of those surveyed 
thinks that there is democracy in Georgia, almost the same num-
3
ber who thought so in November, 003. Very few feel that they 
found their place in life. Notwithstanding such evaluations people 
look with optimism towards future. Such optimism is unchanging 
and is persistently demonstrated in opinion surveys of Georgia’s 
population and could be considered as an asset of the country.
4
The Sample and methodology
The survey was carried out from 5 to 8 June 006 in all nine 
regions of Georgia, Achara and the capital Tbilisi. It included both 
urban and rural areas. The questionnaire consisted of  0 ques-
tions. Interviewers visited respondents at home to take face to 
face interview. Respondents were selected to represent Georgia’s 
population in terms of gender and age
.Table
Geographic distribution of respondents 
  .Sumbadze, N., & Tarkhan-Mouravi, G. (003). Panel survey of Georgia’s population: 
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  .Sumbadze, N., & Tarkhan-Mouravi, G. (004). Public Opinion in Tbilisi: In the Aftermath of the 
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Results
The survey of the Georgia population aimed to assess the percep-
tions of the citizens on issues concerning democracy building, the 
problems of the country, economic developments and external 
orientations. It also aimed to assess their political preferences, as 
well as their prevailing moods on internal politics, the achieve-
ments and failures of the government and their general attitudes. 
Similar studies, carried out by the Institute in 00  and 003  
permit us to make some comparisons and to speak about the way 
in which these perceptions have changed.
7
 
5
4.9% ofrespondents had university education, 6.% had high-
school degrees, 0.8% had vocational education. 3.3% had 8 
years and 0.9% 4 years of schooling. Only 4.% reported to be a 
member of a political party. 9.9% of those surveyed were ethnic 
Georgians, 3.8% were Azeri, .4% were Armenian and .9% were 
of other ethnicity.
Among the surveyed 46.8% were located in urban and 53.% in 
rural areas.  53.6% were females and 46.4% were males. 3.9% 
were 7-4 years old, .9% were 5-34, 3.4% were 35-44, 
.% were 45-54, 3.8% were 55-64 and 5.8% were older than 
66. 64.3% of respondents were married, 4.0% were never mar-
ried, 7.7% were widowed and 4.0% divorced. The size of the 
households varied from  to  members, most often households 
comprised of four members 3.6% of respondents reported 
family member working abroad. 38.8% had some kind of regular 
income.
Employed
39%
Unemployed
21%
Farmers
8%
Pens/stud/homema
kers
32%
Graph 
Employment status of respondents
6
Participation
Participation in decision making is one of the main features of 
liberal democracy. 63.8% consider participation as a necessary 
precondition for solving the acute problems facing the country. 
This compares to 53.8% in 00 and 56.6% in 003. A feeling of 
helplessness prevails among those surveyed. 77.0% think that a 
lay person cannot exert any influence on decisions (77.6% in 2002 
and 7.% in 003). Closely linked to participation is the belief 
that people in power consider opinion of its citizens. 64.7% of 
citizens think that they do not. 
The actual involvement of the population in public life is quite 
low. In 006 only .% appealed to parliament (3.6% in 00 and 
4.6% in 003), 4.7% to local government (6.8% in 00 and 8.0% 
in 003) and .0% participated in any kind of collective action, 
like a street protest (3.9% in 00 and 4.% in 003).
Very few even know how to become involved politically, as few 
respondents were able to identify  instruments of participation. In 
response to questions about effective methods of political involve-
ment 6.8% favoured participation in Non-Government Organiza-
tions (NGOs), 4.3% selected acting through Georgian Media and 
only 0.8% thought they could appeal effectively to local authori-
ties. 
Democracy Building
The 2003 “Rose Revolution” was provoked by the falsification 
of the parliamentary election results and the attack that this rep-
resented on democratic principles.  The survey questioned the 
perception of the new administration on issues of democracy.
 
5.7% of those surveyed did not consider Georgia democratic 
(Only 4.7% do consider Georgia democratic and 3.5% did not 
answer). This is higher than 003 (46.6%), but less than 00 
(56.4%).
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Ways of influencing government
Rule of law, equality  and trust 
Another pillar of liberal democracy, equality under the law, is not 
observed in Georgia according to 70.9% of the population. 7.0% 
thinks that people are equal and .% has no opinion.
After the “Rose Revolution” the feeling of security against unfair-
ness has not changed among 36.% of surveyed, it has increased 
among 35.% and decreased among .4% (6.3%  could not 
answer the question). Trust in state institutions is rather low, none 
of them enjoys the trust of at least half the population. The big-
gest share (47.3%) trusts the President, the smallest share (7.8%) 
trusts  the government.
8
0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00% 35.00% 40.00% 45.00% 50.00%
Government
Courts
Parliament
Sakrebulo
Gamgeoba
Police
Ombudsman
President
Graph 3
Trust  in  state institutions
In the event of the violation of their rights most people (60.0%) 
would go to kin and friends, 35.8% to the Ombudsman and 30.% 
to NGOs . The choices also reflect deficiency of trust to state 
institutions.
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Graph 4
Trust to persons and institutions
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Three years ago, in June 003 the priorities were quite differ-
ent. As in 006 kin and friends were named as the most obvious 
objects of appeal in case of the violation of one’s rights, then 
local authorities, courts, ombudsman and government institutions. 
Comparing the results of the two surveys shows a reduction of 
trust in parliament, government, courts, local authorities and the 
media and an increase in trust towards NGOs and Ombudsman. 
Mistrust is considerable not only towards the state institutions, but 
also towards people in general. More than half, (55.5%) believes 
that majority cannot be trusted (57.% in 00 and 53.% in 003 ).
One of the values of Liberal democracy is the defense of the rights 
of minorities and their equal treatment under the law. The popu-
lation still distinguishes the rights of ethnic Georgians, although 
the proportion of those who discriminate decreased.  The major-
ity, 56.3% (6.% in 00) thinks that ethnic Georgians should 
be privileged in getting high state positions and 58.4% (67.4% 
in 00) think they should be privileged in acquiring land and in  
privatisation.
The overwhelming majority of respondents (95.3%) think that all 
citizens of Georgia should know Georgian (94.0% in 00 and 
9.9% in 003). 7.5% felt at least once during past 6 month op-
pressed due to their ethnicity (4.% in 00 and 4.7% in 003).
The population is even less egalitarian in its attitude towards dif-
ferent religions. 66.% think that other religions should not have 
the same rights in Georgia as the Georgian Orthodox Church.  
According to the biggest share of respondents (48.6%) Catholics 
should have the right to carry out religious services but the vast 
majority do not think that Jehovah Witnesses should have this 
right.
0
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Granted right to carry religious service
The rights of the Moslem population, deported in 944 from 
South Georgia, remains a disputed issue in Georgian society. The 
obligation to repatriate them was signed by the country as the 
precondition of becoming the member of Council of Europe. Not 
much has been done since and the government often points to the 
negative public attitude to repatriation issue as one of the main 
obstacles for the beginning the process.
Our survey showed that the number of opponents of repatriation 
decreased since 00, as 37.4% (50.4% in 00) of population 
thinks that the Moslem population should not be repatriated. Ac-
cording to .5% (4.% in 00) everyone should be granted 
the opportunity to repatriate, according to 35.6% (35.4% in 00) 
only those who considers themselves Georgian should be allowed 
to return. 5.5% did not express opinion. 5.8% do not know 
where repatriated citizens should be resettled. According to 33.% 
this could be done anywhere in Georgia. According to 4.% they 
could be located anywhere in the country except Meskheti.
The living standards of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), who 
have been displaced for more than a decade and number  ,597 
according to 2005 verification, remains a problem. Especially 
BaptistsMoslems

acute is housing problem. The previous government adhered to the 
concept of temporary integration of IDPs to the host society. This 
precluded the long-term solutions of the problem.  The idea was 
that if provided with adequate housing they would be reluctant 
to return to Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Over the past two years 
IDPs have been given an opportunity to purchase apartments. This 
resulted from the efforts of humanitarian aid and the private sector 
who wanted to reconstruct the hotels where the majority of the 
IDPs were living. 
The attitude of population towards housing problem of IDPs sup-
ports the new policy. The majority (56.6%) consider that the Gov-
ernment should provide assistance to IDPs in purchasing apart-
ments,  .0% think the government should not provide assistance 
and .4% have no opinion. 
Chechen refugees still remain in Georgia. The attitude towards 
their stay in the country is equivocal. According to 43.% Chech-
ens should leave the country, according to 37.8%  they could stay 
and 9.% had no answer.

Local elections and political preferences
Elections are considered a test of democracy.  Several questions 
of the survey referred to the forthcoming local elections. One of 
them concerned the belief in fair elections. 38.7% of the popu-
lation did not believe that local elections would be fair (8.% 
expected fairness and 33.0% could not answer the question). Not-
withstanding this, 6.9% planned to take part in them while 8.9% 
did not plan to vote and 8.% had not decided yet.
The biggest share of the respondents (3.0%) could not give 
definite answer to question as to which party they would vote for 
if Parliamentary elections would be hold tomorrow. Among the 
different parties, the National Movement has the biggest number 
of supporters (9.4%).
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Support of the parties
According to the central election committee 47.3% of eligible to 
vote population took part in local  elections, which were held on 
October, 5 . National Movement decisively won the elections (Of-
ficial results of elections were not published by November, 23).  
 3. www.cec.gov.ge
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Respondents were also asked to assess individual politicians. They 
were presented with a list of 8 individuals. 3 in the list represent 
opposition parties. Respondents were requested to give one of 4 
answers; like, dislike, difficult to say, do not know the person. 
Table 
Estimation of politicians 
Most favorably estimated were, Irakli Okruashvili - Minister of 
Defense (6.0%), President Mikhail Saakashvili (59.0%) and 
Nino Burjanadze - the Speaker of Parliament (57.0%).
4
Graph 7
Ten the most popular politicians
The list of most unpopular politicians is headed by Giga Bokeria 
(disliked by 70.6%), Igor Giorgadze (66.5%) and  Kakha Ben-
dukidze (64.8%).
Graph 8
Least popular politicians
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As is demonstrated in the Graph, the least well-known to the 
public are David Zurabishvili, Giorgi Arveladze and David Usu-
pashvili.
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Ranking of unknown politicians
Media
Media freedom is considered as one of the main prerequisites 
of democracy. 34.3% think that after the “Rose Revolution” the 
freedom of television increased. According to 30.5% freedom of 
newspapers increased, and  .0% thought freedom of the radio 
increased.  
Table 3
Estimation of changes in the freedom of media
6
Television undoubtedly remains the primary source for informa-
tion. 94.0% get their  information mainly from television, 55.4% 
from printed media, 8.3% from radio and 6.7% from internet. To 
53.6% friends and kin provide information and 9.6% get infor-
mation from family members.
Channel Imedi’s information programs have the biggest audi-
ence. They are watched by 87.0% of population and trusted also 
by the biggest part - 80.7%.  Rustavi 2’s information programs are 
watched by a slightly smaller number (76.9%), but are trusted by 
far fewer people (59.9%). Public television is watched by 3.5% 
and is trusted by .9%.  
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TV channel, watched and trusted
Imedi also leads the list of the most popular political programs. 
At the top of the list are its two programs –Reactia
( Reaction)  watched by 7.%  and Pirvelebi (The Firsts) 
watched by 64.5%. Imedi is also perceived as independent by 
a much greater portion of respondents (75.0%) than Rustavi 2 
(56.9%).
Among journals the most popular is Sarke. 33.5% reported read-
ing it in the week preceding the survey. Among weeklies Kviris 
Palitra with 8.% and among dailies Akhali Taoba with 6.% 
are the most popular.
7
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Readership of printed media
As mentioned above very few listen to the radio. Radio Fortuna, 
radio Ar Daidardo, Georgia’s Radio and radio Utsnobi  are 
listened by the biggest share of respondents
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8
Governance 
The effectiveness of Governance is the main reason for the popu-
larity and support of the authorities. The Government needs 
considerable trust and public confidence for carrying out drastic 
reforms to change the existing balance of society and the patterns 
of life of the population. Effectiveness of governing is linked to 
how  the most important problems of the country or locality faces 
are dealt with. The disappearance of some problems identified in 
00 and 003 surveys can be seen as indicators of good gover-
nance.
39.7% is convinced that Georgia is on the right path of develop-
ment (3.% thinks it is not and 9.% cannot answer the ques-
tion) . In 00 so thought only 4.0% and in 003 8.8%.
Respondents were asked to choose five from a list of 25 problems  
The social insecurity of population and poverty were chosen as a 
priority by the overwhelming majority (8.6%). It was followed 
by the relations with Russia (68.%), economic crises (60.8%), 
unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and Ossetia (60.1%) and popula-
tion decrease (37.3%).
9
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To assess the success of the government after the “Rose Revolu-
tion” respondents were requested to classify the actions in one 
of four ways: successful, unsuccessful, nothing has changed, or 
difficult to answer.
Table 5
Assessment of the activities of the government after the “Rose 
Revolution”
Repairing roads, building the army and the stabilization of power 
supply, withdrawal of Russian military bases, improvement of 
international image of Georgia  were considered the biggest suc-
cesses of the government, while overcoming poverty, improve-
ment of the economy, conflicts in Abkhazia and Ossetia, Improve-
ment of healthcare services, defense of Human Rights remained as 
the biggest failures.
3
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Success of the government after the “Rose Revolution”
0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00%
Defence of Human
Rights
Improvement of health
care
Conflicts in Abkhazia
and Osseti
Improvement in
economy
Overcoming poverty
Graph 4
Failures of Government
3
Besides evaluating the activities of the government over the past 
two and a half years, respondents were requested to assess  
listed recent activities. Only two activities - organizing patriotic 
youth camps (69.3%) and introduction of a new system of social 
assistance (59.0%) were evaluated by more than half of the re-
spondents as successful. Unsuccessful in the opinion of more than 
half of the respondents were five activities -  investigation of Gir-
gvliani case (64.%), resolving unrest in the prisons (6.0%), the  
issue of leasing forests for 50 years (58.%), attempts to introduce 
cash machines in market places (54.6%) and actions against rally 
participants (53.5%).
Table 6
Estimations of the recent government actions
As for the country as a whole economic concerns are central for 
all localities as well.  8.4% chose unemployment as one of the 
main local problems. The other most frequently chosen problems 
were drug addiction (4.8%), access to quality education (40.6%),  
the condition of roads (36.0%) and emigration (34.%).
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Table 7
Rank order of local problems
We had quite a similar situation in previous surveys, where 
economic concerns, especially unemployment were the highest 
priority. In November 00 we asked respondents to select from 
a list the three most important local problems. Unemployment, 
poverty and the small size of salaries were chosen by the majority. 
In 003, the three most often chosen local problems were unem-
ployment, power shortage and criminality. 
Besides the evaluation of existing problems we were interested 
in finding out what the population feared most over the next five 
years. The biggest share of the respondents expected an increase 
of poverty (73.7%), increase of illnesses (69.5%), loss of Geor-
gian traditions (6.8%), spread of religious sectantism (54.%), 
increase of violence and crime (53.7%), increase of contamina-
tion of nature (53.2%), increase of corruption (45.6%), conflict on 
ethnic grounds (39.7%) and conflict on religious grounds (39.0%).
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The comparison with previous surveys demonstrates that overall 
the population is more optimistic in 006 than in either 00 or 
003. This can be seen in most issues. The increase in optimism 
is the most substantial regarding corruption and the readiness of 
population to revolt against authorities. But the increase in threat 
of poverty is alarming and, compared to 003, there is an increase 
in the perception that the country will lose a substantial part of its 
traditions. There is also an increased perception that Georgia will 
become the target of Russian military aggression and that there 
will be conflict on ethnic grounds.
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Possible threats facing the country in next 5 years (00, 003 and 
006).
The views of the population were studied not only on existing 
and possible problems but also on possible ways of improving the 
situation. The respondents were offered 4 possible policies and 
requested to select the three policies that were, in their opinion, 
the most effective. Increase of salaries and pensions (74.6%), im-
provement of the relations with Russia (55.3%) and change of the 
government were selected by the greatest share. 
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Table 8
Rank order of effective ways for improving the situation
Respondents were also asked to assess the effectiveness of the 
possible future actions of the government by indicating whether 
the policy would be right or wrong. The demand for the with-
drawal of Russian peacekeepers from conflict zones, direct elec-
tion of local administration and the restoration of autonomy for 
Ossetia were the most popular actions. Most often chosen as the 
wrong policy were the creation of an autonomous region in Ja-
vakheti, the use of force in the resolution of conflicts in Abkhazia 
and Ossetia and the sale of central gas pipe-line to Russia.
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Table 9
Assessment of possible future actions of the government
Education is one of the main indicators of the country’s develop-
ment. Since coming to power the government targeted  to carry 
out educational reform. The reform plan includes the whole 
educational cycle, beginning with the kindergartens and ending 
with doctoral studies. So far reforms have affected the school and 
University education. The most drastic change was the introduc-
tion of National Exams for the entry to university. Preceding the 
reform discussions concentrated on the issue of corruption and the 
amount of money spent by the household for exam preparation. 
National Exams were portrayed as the means of overcoming these 
two problems. The survey suggested that the reforms have been 
successful in fighting corruption, but did not suggest that there 
has been a  decrease in the money spent by household  for exam 
preparation.
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Effects of education reform
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The decrease in corruption is certainly one of the main successes 
of the government. Very few provide interviewees cite examples 
of solicitation or payment of bribes. Only .0% indicated such 
examples in health care and .0% in educational institutions.
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Solicitation of bribes (relating to health care services this question 
was not included in the 00 survey). 
Regaining control over Abkazia and Ossetia and return of the 
IDPs to their native homes is undoubtedly the biggest problem 
that the Georgian state faces There are suggestions that the state 
may use force to resolve this problem. As in the previous years, 
this survey demonstrated the reluctance of population to use force. 
74% are against using force in either Abkhazia or South Ossetia. 
Moreover the number of persons who oppose the use of force has 
steadily increased over years.
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Number of persons who are against using force for solving prob-
lems in Abkhazia and Ossetia
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External orientations
The support of the population for the Government’s foreign policy 
choices is also crucial for pursuing the goals set by the country. 
The perceived importance of foreign policy orientation is linked to 
the country’s perceived future dependence on other countries. Ac-
cording to 34.4% the future of the country is mostly dependent on 
its own actions. According to 3.4% it is dependent  upon other 
countries, particularly Russia and USA. According to 8.6% it de-
pends on both. 5.6% could not answer the question. The share of 
those who believe that Georgia forges its own fate has decreased 
since in 003  44.9% and in 003 53.5% thought so.
Central to the country’s politics remains the choice between a 
Western orientation that looks towards Europe and US or an 
orientation towards Russia. Choice in orientation is significantly 
affected by events and Russian policy towards Georgia. After de-
taining Russian army officers on charges of espionage in October 
006 (4 months after the survey), and following the xenophobic 
behavior of Russians towards Georgians in Russia, we may expect 
that attitudes have changed. Nevertheless, in June when asked 
to choose the orientation of Georgia, the majority (59.0%) chose 
Russia over USA (4.0%) Such preference, although is not big, 
has proven to be stable. In 00 Russia was chosen by 56.% and 
in 003 by 5.9% of population.
In contrast to demonstrated preference of Russia the share of those 
favouring membership of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) declined. 3.% of respondents consider that Georgia 
should continue membership. In 00 39.0% were in favour of 
membership and in 003 44.9% .
On the other hand the desire for NATO and EU membership 
is high and stable, showing a slight increase over time.  6.8% 
favours NATO membership (6.0%  in 00 and 56.4% in 003), 
6.6% are against it and 0.6% has no opinion.  Even greater is 
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the support of population for the country aspiration to EU mem-
bership. 74.0% is for membership, 9.0% is against and 7.0% has 
no opinion. The share of supporters increased over time. In 00 
69.5%  and in 003 7.% were for membership.
  
Also linked to foreign policy is the perception of foreign friend-
liness towards Georgia. Respondents were requested to choose 
from the listed eight countries, three on whom Georgia could rely 
in case of emergence. 
The three most friendly foreign powers in 006 were Ukraine, the 
USA and the EU. In 00 these were USA, countries of EU and 
Russia. In 003, the USA, Russia and Ukraine. It should be noted 
that EU was not listed as a separate entity in the 003 survey.
The fact that the population of the country seems to maintain a 
strong pro-Russia orientation while at the same time declaring a 
policy of pro-Western development is clearly an issue requiring 
deeper study and analysis.
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Popularity of presidents
From the 2006 survey, the presidents of five countries were 
also represented in 00 and 003 surveys, though in Georgia 
and Azerbaijan the actual leaders differed (Georgia was led by 
Edward Shevardnadze and Azerbaijan by Geidar Aliev). This 
allows a comparison.
Table 0
Attitudes Towards the Presidents
The attitude towards a country is also reflected in the popularity of 
its leaders. Respondents were asked to give their attitude towards 
seven presidents by choosing one of three options: like, dislike 
or difficult to say. Mikhail Saakashvili, Victor Iushchenko and 
George Bush were the most popular presidents, least popular were 
Robert Kocharian, Vladimer Putin and Ahmed Sezer.
4
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Popularity of the national leaders in five countries over the years
4
Poverty
Estimation of economic condition of the household
Poverty undoubtedly remains the most pressing problem that the 
country faces. 33.7% considers their family to be poor, 64.9% of 
medium affluence and only 1.4% as well-off. 45.4% pointed at 
the worsening economic conditions of their household compared 
to 3 years ago. According to .3% it improved and according 
to 33.4% it did not change. A bit less, 40.4% estimated that their 
situation was worse than one year ago. According to 7.9% it 
improved and according to 4.7% it did not change.
Comparing these estimations with the answers in 00 and 003 
it can be said that there are no drastic changes in perception of 
affluence, though compared to 2002 more people feel that their 
economic situation worsened during past three years (3.% felt 
worse in 00 and 45.4% in 006). There is no change in econom-
ic optimism. As in earlier surveys respondents demonstrate strong 
faith in improving economic conditions. 4.8% are convinced that 
it will improve in one, and 56.8% in three years. 
Incomes and expenditures
Unemployment is the main reason for the poor economic condi-
tion of households. In 3.6% of surveyed households no one had 
any kind of income for at least for three months in an year. In 
9.3% of households all their members had income. Most often 
half of family members generate income. 
Respondents reported spending by their households in May from 
0 to 8000  GEL. Most often they estimated around 00 GEL. 
On average expenditures per household member amounted to 
8.9 GEL, most often named sum being 50 GEL while necessary 
monthly income was estimated on average as 330. GEL, most 
often named was 100 GEL. Expenditures are less than official 
subsistence minimum of average consumer determined as 94GEL 
by June, 006. 
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Share of household members with regular income
As for the respondents themselves, only 4.9% reported having 
monthly income and 4.6% occasional income.
Respondents were requested to identify monetary income sources 
from a list provided.  The most common sources were salary  
(5.3%), pension and state allowance (47.5%), and income from 
realization of agriculture produce (.4%).
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Income sources of household members
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Property
93.5% own the flat/house where the household lives. 3.9% do not 
own the flat but did not pay for it and 2.6% rents it. After apart-
ments, the most common possessions are TV, refrigerator and 
mobile phone.
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Household possessions
Not many respondents had any possessions for income genera-
tion. 8.8% reported having commercial space, 7.5% had some 
kind of appliance which the household used for income genera-
tion, 4.5% had car and .% had a plot of land which household 
use for commercial ends.
Poverty had an adverse effect on the health of respondents. 
5.6% pointed to at least one instance in 006 when they were 
ill but did not visit doctor. Among them, the main reason for not 
visiting the doctor was financial (78.8%) , 16.2% did not con-
sider illness to be serious, .8% did not trust doctors and .% 
named other reasons.
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Poverty profile
If we rule out extremely large households (with 0 and more 
members) we can see that the poverty is associated with smaller 
households.
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Household size its relationship to poverty
The self identification of a household as ‘poor’ is connected to 
the monthly expenditures in that household per person. However, 
income is not the sole factor.  74.8% of “poor” households spent 
less than 50 GEL per person per month and 5.4% from 5 to 00 
GEL. However the share of those who do not consider themselves 
poor but who spent less than 50 GEL is also quite high (49.5%) 
and of those spending between 5-00 GEL is 9.%. In total 
90.% of “poor” and 78.6% of “non-poor” households spent less 
than 00 GEL per person. 
The Difference between families that classify themselves poor and 
those who consider themselves not-poor is also linked with esti-
mation of the money needed per person per month ( Chi-square 
0.4; df , p<05). 34.7% of “poor” and 7.9% of “non-poor” 
families estimated the need less than  to 00 GEL.
From 7 respondents  only 38 provided information on in-
come and  on expenditures.
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Table 
Number of respondents reporting on household income and ex-
penditures.
Affluence is correlated with the share of employed household 
members (Chi-square 8.6; df 3, p<00), the bigger share of em-
ployed is observed among “non-poor” households.
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Share of household members with regular income in households 
that classify themselves “poor” and ”non-poor”.
Affluence is also correlated to the number of sources of income 
(Chi-square 0.6; df 6, p<005) as well as the type of income 
sources.  “Poor” people are more reliant on irregular income than 
“non-poor” (Chi-square 4.6; df , p<00), while more “non-
poor“ name salaries and stipend (Chi-square 34.5; df , p<00) 
and business (Chi-square 9.9; df , p<00) as income source.
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“Poor” and “non-poor” differ in their evaluation of the changes 
that have taken place over the last  year/3 years as well as over 
their expectations of future economic change in their households. 
A much higher proportion of “poor” (68.5%), than of “non-poor” 
(33.3%) experienced deterioration of their economic condition 
compared to three years ago (Chi-square 3.8; df , p<00).  
Similar is the situation in regard of the change compared to one 
year ago (Chi-square 47.9; df , p<00), where 63.5% of “poor” 
and 8.4% of “non-poor” reported a deterioration in their condi-
tions. “Non-poor” also look with more optimism to the future than 
the “poor”. 4.3% of “poor”, compared to 5.6% of “non-poor” 
expect improvements of their economic condition in one years 
time (Chi-square 05.6; df , p<00) and 35.8% of “poor” and 
68.0% of “non-poor” in three years time (Chi-square 0.0; df , 
p<00) . 
Statistical difference between “poor” and “non-poor” in all kinds 
of possessions is significant. “Poor” households have much less 
possessions than “non-poor”. This difference is especially appar-
ent in ownership of mobile phones, water heater, video player and 
car.
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Possessions of “poor” and “non-poor” households 
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Likewise, more “non-poor” have the means and facilities for 
business, although ownership of that kind of facilities is quite low 
among both groups.
As indicated above, poverty deters person from visiting the doc-
tor. 77 of “poor” respondents were ill during the year, but did 
not visit the doctor. Among them 5 or 90.6% did not do so for 
financial reasons. 318 persons from “non-poor” families were ill, 
but much smaller  proportion 73.%  did not visit the doctor  for 
financial reasons.
Appraisal of the economic condition does not differ significantly 
between rural and urban population although there are consider-
able differences in spending patterns. City dwellers not only spend 
much more per person per month than rural population (07.6 
GEL against 59.0 GEL), but consider that far more money is nec-
essary to have a decent life. (493. GEL compared to 86.8 GEL 
per member of the household). The urban population also claims 
to need a higher income relative to their current expenditure. The 
rural population claims to need 3 times more they spend, while 
urbanites say they need, on average,  4 ½ times more amount than 
they spend.
The rural population  more negatively estimate the changes of 
economic conditions of their households. . A bigger share of them 
(43.6% compared to 36.7% of urbanites) identify a deterioration 
of the situation since last year and express less optimism relating 
to likely improvements in next year (39.% compared to 47.0% 
of urbanits). A bigger share of urban (48.0%) than rural (36.3%) 
respondents have an income.
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Country  events
There have been three Presidents of Georgia since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Zviad Gamsakhurdia (990-99), Eduard 
Shevardnadze (99-003) and Mikhail Saakashvili (004-pres-
ent day). Respondents were asked to rank all three. Saakashvili is 
the most popular among the three, with Gamsakhurdia second and 
Shevardnadze third.
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Ratings of the presidents of Georgia
Respondents were also asked to rate the impact on the country 
of some prominent members of Georgian society. Out of the  
persons offered, Ilia II, Patriarch of Georgia was considered to 
have had the most positive impact while Levan Ramishvili, head 
of NGO “Liberty Institute” had the highest negative impact. 
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Rank order of persons by positive impact
Table 
Estimation of impact of persons
Respondents were also asked to name the three most influential 
people in Georgia. In answering the question some named organi-
zations (e.g. EU, Liberty Institute) rather than people. The major-
ity restricted themselves to citizen’s of Georgia, while some listed 
people of other nationalities (e.g. President George W. Bush, 
President Vladimir Putin and George Soros). President Saakash-
vili was named most often with 76.9%, Parliament speaker Nino 
Burjanadze had 6.0% and President Bush, 4.5%.
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Persons that have the biggest influence on the events in Georgia
Respondents were asked to choose the 5 most important events in 
the last two decades. They were provided a list of 6 choices. The 
5 most often chosen events were 9th of April  1989 the conflict in 
Abkazia, the declaration of Independence, the “Rose Revolution” 
and the 99-99 civil war.
Table 3
Rank order of the most important events
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Attitudes and Values
Value orientations were measured by a materialist/post-materi-
alist value scale (Inglehart, 977). This is a 4-item instrument 
designed for measuring whether individuals subscribe to ‘materi-
alist’ values, that focus on the maintenance of order in the nation 
and price stability or ‘post-materialist’ values that focus on giving 
people more say in government decisions protecting their freedom 
of speech. The respondents were requested to choose the most im-
portant two values from four options. Respondents were grouped 
as ‘materialist’ if they chose the two materialist values, ‘post-
materialist’ if they chose those two values, and ‘mixed’ if they 
chose one of each. The majority 5.8% chose materialistic values 
(43.0% in 00 and  4.0 % in 003), 44.9% chose mixed values 
(54.0% in 00 and  56.4%% in 003) and only .3% (3.0% in 
00 and .6% in 003) choose post-materialistic values. 
Three questions also evaluated the attitude towards domestic 
violence.  97.6% said that it was unacceptable to physically abuse 
elder family members (0.4% thinks it proper, % are uncertain). 
9.% think is unacceptable to abuse a 0-5 years old child  
(8.8% think it proper). 66.0% think that abusing your wife in un-
acceptable, even in the case of adultery (22.8% think it is justified 
in this context and .% are uncertain). The population is also 
against the display of force in television news. 56.7% think that  
they should not show the arrest of suspects (33.5% think it is OK 
and 9.8% has no opinion). 
The majority express pride in being citizens of Georgia. 77.3% 
(78.4% in 00, 70.8% in 003) associate positive feelings with 
it, no feelings are evoked in .3% (9.4% in 00 and 6.6% in 
003) and negative feelings are evoked in .4% (.% in 00, 
.6% in 003).
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Feeling of having control over own life is  decreasing. 68.9% in 
00, 78.6% in 003 and only 56.5% in 006 were convinced that 
what person achieves in life mainly depends on individual. Ac-
cording to the remaining 43.5% (30.% in 00, .4% in 003) it 
is more dependent on  others or situation.
Respondents were also asked whether they were satisfied with dif-
ferent elements of their lives. Out of the eight different ‘aspects’ 
more than half of those surveyed expressed satisfaction with two 
elements. People were generally satisfied with their family rela-
tionships and living location and were least satisfied with their 
family income.
Table 4
Satisfaction with different aspects of life
In 003 the same question was asked (though health was not 
considered). A comparison of 003 and 006 suggests that people 
are more satisfied with their living location, but they are less satis-
fied with employment and family income. There is no change in 
attitude to family relationships. There is an increased polarisation 
on issues of housing (with an increase in both, satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction), and increased uncertainty in regard to situation in 
the country and general satisfaction with life (with higher percent-
ages answering that it is ‘difficult to say’). Satisfaction was not 
assessed in the survey of 00
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Satisfaction with different aspects of life
Dissatisfaction prevails in the estimation of one’s own achieve-
ments. 49.3% do not think that  they have found their place in life 
(4.9% in 00 and  36.% in 003), 33.0% thinks that they have 
found it (35.9% in 00 and  3.3% in 003) and 7.7% is uncer-
tain (.% in 00 and 3.6% in 003).
Notwithstanding a low level of satisfaction  the population ex-
presses optimism about the future and this has grown since 003. 
88.5% looks towards the future with hope (85.6% in 003, not 
asked in 00) and 55.4% thinks that things will go their way 
(53.4% in 00 and  5.6% in 003).
Satisfaction with life is strongly connected to justice and self-de-
termination. Unfortunately only one-third of the surveyed (3.4%) 
believe that their advancement will be the result of hard-work 
(55.% does not think so and .5% is uncertain). However, belief 
in meritocratic advancement has improved. In 00/3 very slightly 
less than a quarter believed that hard work was the main basis for 
advancement. 
When asked to select three different skills needed for advance-
ment, out of 7 choices respondents picked knowledge of for-
eign language (7.7%), computer skills (66.4%) and useful ties 
(44.6%) as the most important.
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Skills/characteristics that will determine advancement
Respondents were also asked to choose from the listed  features 
needed for getting high position in state institution. Professional 
knowledge, moral strength, patriotism, intelligence and level of 
foreign education were most frequently chosen features. 
Table 5
Needed features for getting high position in state institution
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A Different Perspective
Below is presented an attempt to look at the answers to the key 
issues of the survey from the perspective of political orientation/
party support and age. 
Party support
Before the local elections we tried to analyze the survey data 
regarding party support. We grouped the respondents from our 
survey according to who they said they would vote for in case of 
Parliamentary elections held  today.
.Supporters of National Movement  9.4%
.Supporters of all opposition parties  39.6%
3.Undecided     3.0%
No significant age or gender difference was found between the 
supporters of different parties.  
National Movement supporters (NMS) more positively evaluate 
the change of economic condition of their households over the last 
year (5.0%) than supporters of Opposition Parties (OPS) (4.9%) 
or Undecided (U) (5.0%) (Chi-square 7., df=4, p<.005). The 
same holds for the prospective dynamics of economic condition in 
next year. 54.9% of NMS, 36.5% of OPS and 39.6% of U (Chi-
square 30.5, df=4, p<.00) expect improvements.
Undecided are the least interested in reading newspapers. 37.5% 
of them declared that had not read any newspaper or journal dur-
ing the last week. The corresponding number of NMS was 7.9% 
and OPS 3.9% (Chi-square 8.5, df=, p<.00).
After the rose revolution NMS supporters feel themselves more 
secure from injustice (53.4%), than OPS (7.%)  and U (8.3%). 
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Also far fewer NMS (57.0%) think citizens of Georgia are not 
equal under the law. 79.7% of OPS and 7.9% of U do not believe 
in legal equality (Chi-square 58.0, df=4, p<.00). In line with 
this, 0.5% of OPS and 4.0% of U, compared to only 7.6% of 
NMS consider  personal insecurity before representatives of law 
enforcement agencies as a local problem (Chi-square 6.5, df=, 
p<.00).
NMS are more content with the development of the country than 
both other groups. 66.3% of NMS think the country is on the right 
path and only 9.0% of OPS and 8.6% of U (Chi-square 34.4, 
df=4, p<.00) think so.
Although the supporters of different parties do not differ in esti-
mation of the need of popular participation  and self-efficacy to in-
fluence the government, they differ in the perception of how much 
the government considers public opinion (Chi-square 88., df=4, 
p<.00). 36.% of NMS, 3.6% of OPS and .4% of U believe 
that the Government takes  account of public opinion. Also much 
more NMS (4.9%), than  OPS (7,5%0 or U (6.9%) think that 
there is democracy in Georgia (Chi-square 34.6, df=4, p<.00).
Statistically significant differences were found between the three 
groups in their estimation of the threats.  Nine threats to Georgia 
were mentioned in the survey( increase in illnesses amongst the 
population, corruption, environmental contamination, poverty, 
violent crime, the spread of religious sextantism, loosing big part 
of Georgian traditions, conflicts on national and religious grounds) 
that could face Georgia in next 5 years. The pattern in regard of all 
the nine issues is the same so that concerns are highest amongst 
OPS, followed by U. NMS are least concerned about the threats to 
Georgia.
Supporters differently evaluate the importance of some spheres 
for Georgia. National Movement Supporters are bigger support-
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ers of military growth (with 5.3% in favour) than the other two 
groups. OPS have 8.5% support for military growth and unde-
cideds4.3%. (Chi-square 3.9, df=4, p<.00). Also, support for 
NATO and EU membership is higher with NMS at 3.3%, 6.% 
of OPS and 8.5% of U; Chi-square 6.5, df=, p<.05-). For OPS 
the defense of Human Rights is a priority (76.9% of OPS, 73.0% 
of U and 67.4% of NMS; Chi-square 9.0, df=, p<.05) as is re-
form of the legal system (3.9% of OPS, 8.5% of U and .% 
of NMS; Chi-square 7.8, df=, p<.00).
Poverty, relations with Russia, Abkhazian and Ossetian conflicts 
and decrease of the population, as noted above, are estimated as 
the main problems facing the country. All three groups of re-
spondents prioritise these five problems, although they rank them 
differently. While poverty is named as the number one problem 
by all three groups, the second by priority for National Movement 
supporters are the conflicts while supporters of the opposition and 
Undecided identify relations with Russia.
More NMS (3.7%) than OPS (4.%0 or U (.9%) (Chi-square 
.9, df=, p<.005) consider it possible return Abkhazia and Os-
setia by using force (3.8% of NMS, 4.6% of OPS and 0.8% of 
U (Chi-square .4, df=, p<.005). NMS are also less concerned 
with arrests being shown on TV news  (49.8% of NMS, 63.0% of 
OPS and 55.% of U are against showing them , Chi-square 6., 
df=4, p<.005). 
Party supporters differ in many issues concerning external orien-
tation of the country. The central theme remains the orientation 
to Russia or the US. More OPS choose Russia over US (63.8%), 
than U (59.5%) or NMS (5.%) (Chi-square 0.7, df=, p<.005). 
More NMS (56.%) than OPS (49.6%) or U (44.6%) opt for 
Georgia leaving CIS (Chi-square 5.8, df=6, p<.00); Again 
more NMS (78.7%),  than OPS (77.4%) or U (65.%) think that 
Georgia should strive for EU (Chi-square 4.7, df=4, p<.00) and 
60
NATO membership 7.7% of NMS, 6.% of OPS and 55.0% of 
U (Chi-square 7.7, df=4, p<.00).
Overall, as mentioned above belief in the ability to provide onself 
a decent life by honest work is rather low but is higher among 
National Movement supporters (45.3%) than among the opposi-
tion party supporters (5.9%) and undecided (8.6%) (Chi-square 
44.4, df=4, p<.00).
People feel more positive about being citizens of Georgia if they 
are NMS (86.8%) than  OPS  (74.8%) or U (7.5%)  (Chi-square 
5.8, df=4, p<.00).
Not surprisingly, the ranking of politicians by three groups of 
party supporters differs. National Movement supporters like: 
Saakashvili, Okruashvili, Burjanadze, Ugulava, Davitashvili, 
Levan Berdzenishvili, Topadze, Lomaia, Khidasheli and Salome 
Zurabishvili. Supporters of opposition preference list is as fol-
lows: Davitashvili, Levan Berdzenishvili, Khidasheli, Okruashvili, 
Salome Zurabishvili, Dzidziguri, Topadze, Chikradze, Natelas-
hvili and Usupashvili. Undecided like Saakashvili, Okruashvili, 
Levan Berdzenishvili, Burjanadze, Davitashvili, Khidasheli, 
Topadze, Salome Zurabishvili, Dzidziguri and Ugulava.
Politicians were most popular with National Movement Support-
ers and least popular with Undecideds. It is interesting to note 
that in the lists of ten the most popular politicians all three groups 
include representatives of opposition - in the group of Undecided 
seven, in the group of National Movement supporters 5 and 9 
among supporters of opposition parties.
The supporters of National Movement most of all dislike: Gior-
gadze, Natelashvili, Bokeria, Bendukidze, Gamkrelidze, Chi-
kradze, Gamsakhurdia, Kirkitadze, Nadiradze and Merabishvili. 
Supporters of opposition dislike: Bokeria, Bendukidze, Mera-
bishvili, Targamadze, Nadiradze, Giorgadze, Nogaideli, Kirkita-
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dze, Arveladze and Lomaia. The least liked by Undecided  are: 
Bokeria,Giorgadze, Bendukidze, Nadiradze, Targamadze, Kirkita-
dze, Nogaideli, Natelashvili, Arveladze and Lomaia. In this case 
also support does not unequivocally determine the popularity. 
Members of National Movement prevail in the list of ten least 
liked politicions of OPS (9) and U (8) but are also present in the 
list of NMS (5).
The information programs of Public television and Rustavi  are 
more trusted by the supporters of National Movement than mem-
bers of the other two groups. Public television is trusted by 35.% 
of NMS, 5.3% of OPS and 8.% of U. Rustavi  is trusted by 
75.3% of NMS, 53.0% of OPS and 53.8% of U.
More OPS than either NMS or U chose  as important events 
april,9 989  (86.9% of OPS, 8.4% of NMS and 73.8% of U  
Chi-square .6, df=, p<.00) election of Zviad Gamsakhurdia 
as the president (3.3% of OPS, 0.% of NMS and .3% of U  
Chi-square 8.6, df=, p<.00) and death of Zviad Gamsakhurdia 
(.8% of OPS, .3% of NMS and .3% of U  Chi-square 7.9, 
df=, p<.00) . More NMS considered the visit of George Bush 
(6.7% of NMS, 5.3% of OPS and 9.8% of U, Chi-square 6., 
df=, p<.00) and 003 “Rose Revolution” as important events 
(56.4% of NMS, 3.% of OPS and 48.8% of U, Chi-square 5., 
df=, p<.00).
NMS appear to have the most egalitarian attitude towards ethnic 
minorities. When asked if they would consider it appropriate to 
grant priority in land privatization to ethnic Georgians 5.5% of 
NMS agreed, compared to 6.9% or OPS and 59.3% of U (Chi-
square 0.8, df=4, p<.05)
More NMS (68.6%) than OPS (54.35) and U (48.0%) consider 
that what one achieves in life depends more on the person, than 
others and situation (Chi-square 30.8, df=, p<.00) . NMs also 
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express more generalized trust towards mankind as 54.% com-
pared to 39.3% of OPS and 4.% of U considered that majority 
can be trusted (Chi-square 8.6, df=, p<.00). NMS are more 
satisfied than OPS or U with different aspects of life, i.e. work/
studies, apartment, location, situation in the country and life in 
general. More NMS than the other two groups also think that they 
have found their place in life (40.3% of NMS compared to 9.6% 
of OPS and 30.4% of U, Chi-square ., df=4, p<.05). 
NMS are more optimistic generally. NMS are more hopeful about 
the future (NMS, 95.% compared to 86.0% of OPS and 85.3% 
of U, Chi-square 0.9, df=, p<.00)  and more of them think that 
most things will happen in life as one wishes (68.0% compared to 
5.% of OPS and 49.3% of U, Chi-square 30.4, df=, p<.00).
There are also differences between the the groups in terms of their 
assessment of useful attributes for career development in Govern-
ment. NMS puts more value on youth and moral strength, while 
OPS focus on intelligence, and being principled personal ties and 
patriotism. The difference was also revealed in regard to the per-
ception of the qualities and skills needed for carrier advancement 
generally. NMS prioritise knowledge of accounting and com-
puter literacy, while OPS suggest that nepotism is still important 
(through association with the National Movement and others).
The difference between party supporters was also found in ad-
herence to materialistic/post-materialistic values (Chi-square 
5.8, df=4, p<.00). More NMS (6.0%) than OPS (44.8%) and 
U (55.%) choose two materialistic values, while OPS revealed 
more adherence to mixed values, choosing one materialistic and 
the other post-materialistic value.
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Age
The revolution brought to power a younger generation of leaders. 
The parliament and government became much younger. There is 
a general feeling of impotence and pessimism amongst those over 
40. The values of a young generation and their norms and rules 
of behavior prevail in media. These values contrast considerably 
with more traditional content.  The situation creates a contradic-
tion and intergenerational conflict in society.
In order to look at the key issues of the survey from the perspec-
tive of age, respondents were placed into three age groups: 7-34 
years olds  (the first), 35-54 years olds  (the second) and 55 and 
older  (the third).
Persons of different age estimate economic condition of their 
households differently (Chi-square 56.0, df=4, p<.00).  Discon-
tent increases linearly with the age. 20.3% of the first, 39.3% of 
the second, 45.6% of the third age group estimated their house-
hold as “poor”. 29.8% of the first, 43.7% of the second and 52.2% 
of the third group believed that economic condition had deteriorat-
ed over the last year (Chi-square 45.4, df=4, p<.00). Pessimism 
concerning the future also grows with the age as 0.4% of the 
first, 19.4% of the second and 26.1% of the third age group expect 
deterioration of  economic condition in an year’s time (Chi-square 
35.9, df=4, p<.00). 
Generations differ in their preferred sources of information. 35-55 
years olds read more newspapers (Rezonance, Kviris palitra and 
Kronika), while young generation reads more the journals (Sarke, 
Gza,Tbiliseli, Tskheli Shokoladi and Anabechdi).
73.5% of the older generation is concerned with the relations 
with Russia, compared 70.6% in the middle age group and 6.5% 
young (Chi-square 0.6, df=, p<.005). The second age group is 
more concerned with the reduced possibilities of scientific 
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research and hindrances in democratic development of the coun-
try (58.5% compared to 30.8% in the first and 10.8% in the third 
group; Chi-square 6., df=, p<.005). 
It’s not surprising that younger generation is more concerned with 
the lack of entertainment possibilities where they live (56.7% of 
first group compared to 34.9% of the second and 8.4% of the third 
group; Chi-square 69.5, df=, p<.00), while the middle aged 
are more concerned with  power shortages (43.5% of the second, 
29.0% of the first and 27.5% of the third; Chi-square 7.0, df=2, 
p<.05) and deficiency in watering plots (53.7% of the second 
group compared to 26.6% of the first and 19.8% of the third; Chi-
square 8.9, df=, p<.05).
Generations differ in the level of satisfaction with life in general. 
26.6% of the first group are satisfied with life compared to 18.1% 
of the second and 3.% of the third groups (Chi-square 0.9, 
df=4, p<.00). In each of the different aspects the young are also 
more satisfied; work/studies (21.2% of the first, 13.8% of the 
second, and 4.8% of third group Chi-square (.6, df=4, p<.05); 
household income (7.9% of the first, 4.8% of the second, and 
4.4% of third group ( Chi-square 8.7, df=4, p<.005), the assess-
ment of their own  health (55.9% of the first, 33.7% of the second, 
and 4.8% of third group Chi-square (47., df=4, p<.00).
Greater optimism of younger generation is an expected outcome. 
93.3% of the young look at the future with hope compared to 
87.5% of the older respondents (8.7%; Chi-square (0.3, df=, 
p<.00). More of the young also expect that, for the most part, 
everything will happen as they wish (66.3% of first, 51.8% of the 
second and 44.% of third groups Chi-square 34.4, df=, p<.00). 
Young people are also more convinced than older ones that it’s 
possible to achieve advancement by honest work (34.% of the 
first, 33.2% of the second and 27.5% of the third group. Chi-
square .5, df=4, p<.05).
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Older persons are more convinced than younger ones that being 
younger than 30 is a necessary precondition  for career achieve-
ment (44.3% of the third, compared to 37.0% of the second and 
31.7% of the first age group Chi-square 10.3, df=2, p<.05). A 
similar belief exists about the usefulness of membership in the 
National Movement (3.6% of the third, compared to 3.% of 
the second and 25.3% of the first age group Chi-square 6.4, df=2, 
p<.05). On the other hand young people are more convinced that 
for advancement the knowledge of foreign languages is needed 
(77.1% of the first, compared to 71.0% of the second and 63.9% 
of the third age group Chi-square 3.0, df=, p<.005).
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Conclusions
This survey of Georgia’s population reflected the hopes and 
concerns of the citizens, their aspirations, beliefs and attitudes 
towards different aspects of life and traced the changes of percep-
tions since 00.
The results of the survey suggest that the generation of liberal 
Democracy is still in its initial stage. The citizens at large do not 
consider Georgia to be democratic. Many essential aspects of de-
mocracy, such as equality before the law, participation in decision 
making, protection of human rights and justice in judiciary system 
are not realized. At the same time political culture is underdevel-
oped. Support to parties is determined not so much by parties’ ide-
ology as the popularity of their leaders and prominent members. 
The personality of the leader and especially of the President of the 
country is a focal point around which preferences are organized. 
Trust towards both, people in general and state entities is not high. 
The courts and parliament enjoy alarmingly low  trust.  The viola-
tion of human rights is one of the main concerns of population. 
For example, the Girgvliani case where officials of the Ministry of 
the interior were implicated in the murder of a young banker, pro-
duced an unequivocally negative reaction amongst the population 
and perpetuated perceptions that the Government is unconcerned 
with the rule of law.  There are, however, positive trends. Trust 
towards police, in particular, has significantly increased and the 
extent of corruption decreased since 003. 
The survey once more proved power of TV in media, but reflected 
the shift of popularity of channels. Popular in 00 and in 003 
Rustavi 2, lost its leading role to Imedi.  As one of the pillars of 
“Rose Revolution”  Rustavi  2 is now perceived to be  the voice 
of  state authorities.  The debate on state policy, once hosted by  
Rustavi   entirely shifted to Imedi and increased its audience.
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Civic participation remains very low, while the need of partici-
pation is high and has increased over the years. The population 
thinks that the authorities disregard their opinion and as a result 
they feel helpless to influence decisions. The government should 
be wary of ignoring these concerns since exactly these feel-
ings provided the basis for discontent which ultimately fuelled 
the “Rose Revolution”.  It’s worth noting that our 003 survey 
asked respondents about the possible actions that could be taken 
by population and very many suggested that a revolt against the 
existing government was possible.
Supporters of the leading party, the National Movement, oppo-
sition parties and those not having political preferences do not 
differ in age composition, but do differ in their evaluation of the 
economic condition of their households. National Movement sup-
porters differently and much more benevolently evaluate actions 
of authorities than supporters of the opposition parties and those 
with no distinct preference. These groups ascribe different weight 
to problems and have different values and attitudes. Although the 
positions of the opposition supporters and of undecided are much 
more similar, than of National Movement supporters. National 
Movement supporters are less critical and more optimistic. Unifi-
cation of opposition forces and hence their  strengthening remains 
public demand.
The Georgian Government has chosen a Western orientation in 
its policy.  The population backs the aspiration for Georgia to 
become a member of European Union and NATO.  However, 
relations with Russia remain one of their central concerns. In ad-
dition, at least prior to recent events, this opinion survey suggests 
that society is split in its strategic orientation with no overwhelm-
ing support for either US or Russia, but with a slight increase in 
Russian orientation since 003. This may result from Russia’s 
economic and social leverage, as  a reaction to the proclaimed 
Western course of Georgia and  to the US’s ambivalence to the 
democratic infractions of the current Government.
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Comparison of 00, 003 and 006 data shows an increase in the 
role of civil society. NGOs became more salient and more trusted 
than before and more people think it is appropriate to appeal to 
them in case of violation of their rights. 
Improvement of infrastructure is perceived by many to be one 
of the main successes of the new government. Resolution of the 
frozen conflicts with Abkhazia and Osseti are declared preroga-
tives of the government. Conflicts are considered by population 
as one of the main problems of the country, but  more and more 
people consider military settlement of these disputes completely 
unacceptable. 
Poverty remains the plague of the country. It is identified by 
population as the major  problem of the country. One third of the 
respondents estimate their households as poor. This is in line with 
the official statistics. According to the department of statistics  
for the first quarter of  2006 the spending of 33.6% of population 
was below the consumption minimum. Unemployment is closely 
linked with poverty.  Families who are better off are more often 
those where half of their members have some kind of employ-
ment. Diversification of income sources, as well as some specific 
sources are still features enabling household to avoid poverty. 
Those who classify themselves “non-poor” usually have some 
income from business, while the “poor” have to rely on irregular 
work. There are many consequences of poverty, traditional and 
just emerging for society. e.g. Poverty is a contributing factor in 
health issues since the Georgian poor have significantly dimin-
ished access to good diet and health-care. In Georgia’s recently 
established privately financed University system educational ac-
cess is also limited.
The survey results once more also demonstrated the partially 
subjective nature of poverty. Besides monetary income self clas-
sification of ‘poor’ is closely linked with a person’s general mood, 
in-kind income and frame of comparison. Young respondents, 
for example, perceive their household as more affluent than older 
ones.
  5.www.statistics.ge
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The population also supports the idea that urban society is devel-
oping faster than rural society. More rural than urban respondents 
believe their conditions have deteriorated during the past year and 
a smaller portion of rural population has a regular income source, 
and hence spend less, than urbanites.  
The population, therefore, remains discontented with economic 
conditions, violation of human rights and continues to feel that 
their opinions are not taken into consideration. In addition there  is 
a clear social division between supporters of the National Move-
ment and the rest of the public. On the other hand, the survey 
proved the continuing popularity of the President of Georgia and 
acknowledged achievements of authorities in fighting corruption, 
infrastructure development and army building. 
The population does not show high satisfaction with life in gen-
eral. The number who think that Georgia is on the rights path 
has increased over the years but is still low and slightly exceeds 
one third of population. About one third thinks it impossible to 
reach normal living standards by the honest work alone, showing 
a  slight decrease since 003. Only a quarter of those surveyed 
thinks that there is democracy in Georgia, almost the same num-
ber who thought so in November, 003. Very few feel that they 
found their place in life. Notwithstanding such evaluations people 
look with optimism towards future. Such optimism is unchanging 
and is persistently demonstrated in opinion surveys of Georgia’s 
population and could be considered as an asset of the country.
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